Chautauqua Institution is a one-of-a-kind summer casual resort where individuals and families go to participate in lectures, concerts, films, sports, swimming, boating, bicycling, religious services and study… and to reflect on the issues of the day. Each week features a different theme, and this week’s theme was foreign policy.
My wife and I spent last week immersed in this wonderful place. From the world-class symphony, to sessions with acclaimed authors, to incredible arts exhibitions, and more, Chautauqua is nothing short of amazing.
But I must say that I also came away from the lectures even more troubled about how hopelessly complicated our world has become. Virtually every major speaker reinforced in great detail how each country in the Middle East and elsewhere has a different set of circumstances requiring a completely different set of strategic initiatives.
Some aspire at least partially to American basic values, while others are only strategically critical to our national security. And our inconsistency in explaining and dealing with all this has strengthened anti-American sentiments, making the task of diplomacy even more difficult.
There seems to be no one doctrine or policy statement that can cover all of these bewildering situations. Aaron David Miller, former diplomat and scholar in residence at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said in a presentation this week that, “these problems are generational in character, bi-partisan in nature, and yield to only approximate solutions at best.”
As I listened to these lectures, I naturally found myself reflecting on the communication challenges and realities of making America understood in this volatile international climate. Reluctantly, I had to agree that there is no simple central message or statement that will adequately explain U.S. foreign policy initiatives. But I have been thinking lately that there might be a set of communication “objectives” that could explain Miller’s observation about the need to settle for “approximate solutions.”
Previous to Chautauqua I had already developed a hypothesis from periodic Washington interviews and conversations. What is missing, I thought, is the existence of one central executive branch strategic communication planner charged with involving every agency and department in an integrated planning process before anything happens. My impression was that only general guidelines are shaped, and then are carried out as each agency sees fit… essentially creating independent “silos” which end up adding to widespread confusion and clutter.
Would it not be possible for a central plan to focus on communicating two clear U.S objectives: one objective for countries that support U.S. values, and another for those that are only strategically important to national interests? Then, as in all institutional strategic communication, key points that advance these two objectives can be repeated relentlessly through a variety of old and new media… all aimed to cut through the clutter of confusing daily news reports.
The weeks and months ahead for me will largely focus on assessing the effectiveness of strategic communication in U.S. foreign policy more systematically, and on exploring ways expanded public diplomacy initiatives and the internationalization of higher education can help improve world understanding. I invite you to follow my journey.
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